The reasons that the European Union has such great difficulty in dealing with the debt amassed by several of its members (and many of its banks!) run much deeper than it seems. The EU has been trying to act increasingly as if it were one nation—the United States of Europe—without developing the kind of loyalties and commitments only nations can elicit from their citizens. Nations are particularly strong communities. The clearest sociological test for the national level of the communal bonds is that people are willing to die for their nation; no one is even thinking about dying for the EU.
欧盟处理由几个成员国（和许多欧洲银行！）积聚的债务如此艰难的原因比看起来要深刻得多。欧盟一直试图越来越多地表现为一个单一国家——欧罗巴合众国——而未建立起只有国家从其公民中才能引起的忠诚感。国家是特别牢固的群体。对公共债券的国家等级而言，最一目了然的社会学测试是人民愿意为国捐躯；而没有人愿意为欧盟献身。
Another indication is the level of economic sacrifice one is willing to make for the community. The West Germans gave the equivalent of a trillion dollars to the East Germans in the decade that followed unification with little hesitation. “They are fellow Germans” was about all the explanation that was needed. However, the same Germans have a very hard time granting much smaller amounts to Greece and other EU nations that are in trouble. They are not members of “the tribe.”
另一个指标是个人愿意为群体作出的经济牺牲的等级。西德在十年中给予了东德一万亿美元的等价物，紧随而来的是几乎毫不犹豫的统一。“他们是日尔曼同胞”足以解释一切。然而，同样是这群日尔曼人却很难同意给予希腊和其它陷入困境的欧盟国家少得多的钱款。他们不是“本部族”的成员。
Americans can readily gain insight into this same phenomenon. Once every few years, some reporter will call attention to the fact that, in the United States, southern and midwestern states pay substantially fewer taxes and gain a disproportionately larger share of the federal outlays than do the northern states. However, such stories have very short legs; these are fellow Americans, case closed. In contrast, when Americans are asked to extend much smaller amounts to other nations than the wealthier states (say, Connecticut and New York) give to the poorer states (such as Mississippi and Alabama) in the union, this is called foreign aid, and it is widely opposed.
美国人能轻易地洞察到同样的现象。每隔几年，一些记者就会呼吁关注这样的事实：在美国，南部和中西部州大体上纳较少的税，而比起北方诸州分得不成比例的的大份额的联邦支出。然而，这样的故事站不住脚；这些都是美国同胞，争论便止息了。与此相反，当美国人被请求给予其它国家比起富州（例如康涅狄格和纽约州）给予穷州（例如密西西比和阿拉巴马）的少得多的钱款时——这叫做对外援助——这却遭到了广泛反对。
The trouble with the EU is that, although it started like a free-trade zone, it is increasingly seeking to make EU-wide decisions on many economic and social policies—policies that benefit some members and cause much pain to others—without first building a strong community. This is essential in order for people to be willing to make significant sacrifices for “others.”
欧盟的烦恼是，虽然有如同一个自由贸易区般的开局，它却不断追求将欧盟扩张的决定贯彻到经济和社会政策——使一些成员受益，而对其余成员造成许多痛苦的政策——却未曾首先建立起一个社群。而为了让人们愿意为“他人”作出重大牺牲，这一点是必要的。
True, the EU tried to build shared sentiments. It fashioned a flag of its own in the form of a circle of stars, and its logo is displayed on car license plates and on the beaches. It also arranged for student exchanges and a few other such rather inane measures. The net result has been some, albeit rather limited, increase in a commitment to Europe, especially among the young—but not to the EU and its institutions.
诚然，欧盟设法构建共享的情感。它将自己的旗帜塑造成由金星组成的圆环形式，它的徽标展示于汽车牌照和海滩上。它也安排了交换生项目和其它几种诸如此类的确切地说是空洞的措施。最终结果是得到了一些——更确切的说是有限的——对欧洲的承诺的提升，特别是在年轻人中——但却不是对欧盟及其体系。
Worse, the EU made a move which cannot but be considered a sociological bomb. It both expanded and “deepened” at the same time. Over the last decade, it has added twelve new members, including Poland, Slovakia, Cyprus, Malta and Romania. It now totals 27 members who differ greatly in their values, interests, politics and much else. Long before these differences could be muted and strong, shared commitments could be developed, the EU also decided to move from what was largely a requirement for unanimous rule (which meant that every member, in effect, had a veto power) to a majority rule in many matters. It now compels those in the minority to make sacrifices of a magnitude they are not necessarily ready to make.
更糟糕的是，欧盟作出了一项只能被认为是社会学炸弹的举动。它同时扩张了，并“加深”了。过去十年中，欧盟新加入了十二个成员国，包括波兰，斯洛伐克，塞浦路斯，马耳他和罗马尼亚。目前欧盟共有27个成员国，他们在价值观，利益，政治和其他许多事务上分歧巨大。早在这些差异能够趋缓和牢固的共同承诺能够得到发展之前，欧盟也决定，在许多事情上从意见一致原则（这意味着每个成员国，从效力上讲，都有否决权）的需要转变为少数服从多数原则。如今它强迫属于少数派的成员国作出本不必达到的量级的牺牲。
Trying to overcome the resulting weaknesses, the EU discussed the appointment of a full-time President of the European Council to serve a term of two and a half years, to replace the existing system of rotating presidencies every six months, as well as a Union Minister of Foreign Affairs (to speak for the whole EU). However, these changes ran into such opposition that the final Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 established the President of the European Council without abolishing the rotating six-month Presidency of the Council of the European Union and changed the title of Union Minister of Foreign Affairs to High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (who is considered a chairman, rather than a foreign minister)—and rather weak persona were chosen for these posts. Meanwhile, due to open-border policies, the EU faces challenges that arise from the large flow of illegal and legal immigrants from Africa that some nations (e.g. Italy and Spain) in effect admit into other nations (such as Germany, the UK and France). These immigrants are troubling to the natives because they are held to undermine the public order, tax the social services, take jobs from the locals and heed different values and traditions than the prevailing ones in the countries they seek to make their home.
为试图克服作为结果的虚弱，欧盟讨论了任命一名全职的欧洲理事会主席——任期为两年半——以替代现有的每六个月轮值主席国和和一名欧盟外交部长（为整个欧盟发言）的制度。然而，这些改变陷入了这样的反对之中：在2009年最终的里斯本条约确立了欧洲理事会主席而并没有废除六个月轮值主席国制度，也将欧盟外交部长的头衔改为欧盟外交与安全政策高级代表（这个职位被认为是主席而不是外交部长），并且很弱势的角色被选择担当这些职位。与此同时，由于开放边界政策，欧盟面临随着大量非法和合法非洲移民人口流动带来的挑战，一些国家（如意大利和西班牙）实际上准许这些移民进入其他国家（如德国、英国和法国）。对当地居民来说，这些移民带来了麻烦，因为他们正在危害公共秩序、税收和社会服务，从本地人手中夺走工作机会，比起他们设法建立自己家园的国度中的主流群体，他们更注重不同的价值观和传统。
The EU thus faces two basic choices. The first is to retreat to a much lower level of integration and become basically a glorified trade union, which combines a free flow of goods with the harmonization of numerous, largely administrative laws but allows each country to manage its own economy, borders and polity. (This may well entail giving up the Euro and restoring national borders.) This is the likely course to be followed. Or the EU could move to a much higher level of integration and create a union akin to that of the U.S., for which there is rather little support. But the EU cannot stand between two stairs, as it is trying to do as it seeks to find its footing.
因此欧盟面临两个基本选择。第一个是退回到一个低得多的整合水平，基本上成为一个美其名曰贸易联盟，它将商品的自由流动与主要是行政的大量法律——但允许每个国家自行管理经济，边境和政体（这可能将导致放弃欧元并恢复国家边界）——结合起来。这是接下来可能发生的过程。或者欧盟可能达到一个高得多的整合水平，并创建一个类似于美国那样的联盟，而几乎没有人支持这样做。但是欧盟不可能脚踏两只船，就像它争取找到立足点时努力做的那样。
